江鴻助手（三十八）——博弈決策方式
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Share interest, spread happiness, increase knowledge, leave beautiful. Dear, this is Learningyard New Academy. Today, Xiaobian brings to you: Jiang Hong assistant (38) - game decision mode.
除了博弈方、博弈得益、博弈信息等有關博弈結構的客觀和環境因素以外，博弈方的決策方式是一個更重要的問題。
In addition to the objective and environmental factors related to the game structure, such as game players, game benefits, game information, the decision-making mode of game players is a more important issue.
在很多博弈模型的假設中，博弈方都是理性的，他們都會按照自身利益或效用最大化原則決策行為。但現實中的人們與「理性的人」有很大差別，不僅可能犯錯誤，任性盲目的行為也比比皆是，因此理性人假設很多情況下不現實，所以要保證博弈分析的價值，必須考慮博弈方的理性局限。
In many game models, the assumption is that the players are rational, they will make decisions based on their own interests or utility maximization principle. However, people in reality are very different from "rational people". Not only may they make mistakes, but also willful and blind behaviors are everywhere. Therefore, the assumption of rational people is unrealistic in many cases.
現代博弈論考慮的第一種情況是接近理性人但偶爾會犯錯誤的情況，分析此類問題和分析理性人問題類似，解決此類問題需要適當使用均衡概念和相應分析方法替代理性人問題的博弈分析。
The first case considered by modern game theory is the case that is close to the rational man but occasionally makes mistakes. Analyzing such problems is similar to analyzing the rational man problem. To solve such problems, it is necessary to properly use the concept of equilibrium and corresponding analysis methods to replace the game analysis of the rational man problem.
第二種情況是雖然不符合理性人假設，但理性程度比較高，只是在預見性、判斷分析、決策能力等方面存在一定局限，但有較強的學習和模仿能力。在現實中，此類有限理性問題非常普遍。處理這種問題的方法需要引進特定的學習模仿、策略調整模式。
The second case is that although it does not conform to the hypothesis of reasonable person, it has a relatively high degree of rationality. It only has certain limitations in foresight, judgment and analysis, decision-making ability and so on, but it has strong learning and imitation ability. In reality, this kind of bounded rationality problem is very common. The approach to deal with this problem requires the introduction of a specific model of learning imitation and strategy adjustment.
第三種情況是理性程度極低、決策選擇比較盲目的情況。處理這種問題不能採用個體決策的分析方法，要在群體行為的意義上，討論個體盲目行為和群體淘汰選擇的進化均衡。
The third case is a very low degree of rationality, the decision choice is relatively blind. To deal with this problem, we should discuss the evolutionary equilibrium between individual blind behavior and group selection in the sense of group behavior.
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文案--閆慶紅
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審核--楊生燕