【新刊速遞】《衝突解決雜誌》(JCR), Vol.67, No.1,2023

國政學人 發佈 2024-03-30T00:45:56.058483+00:00

This study analyzes the institutional variation across domestic legal systems, with a focus on common law system’s adherence to precedent and reduced recourse to judicial deference, as well as on the degree of independence afforded to courts. These institutional qualities of judiciaries provide the opportunity for courts to play a more active role in the implementation of post-conflict justice, increasing uncertainty for other policymakers concerning the ultimate contours of post-conflict justice processes. To reduce such uncertainty, policymakers ensconced in these types of institutional contexts will be less likely to implement post-conflict justice. Using data from the Post-Conflict Justice dataset, we find that states with common law systems are less likely to pursue and implement post-conflict justice compared to states with civil or Islamic law systems. Moreover, independent courts will be less likely to pursue mixed or restorative forms post-conflict justice, though the impact of judicial independence is weak overall.

期刊簡介

《衝突解決雜誌》(Journal of Conflict Resolution)是一份關於人類衝突的社會科學研究和理論的跨學科雜誌。該雜誌主要關注國際衝突,但也探討了各種國家、群體間和人際衝突。該期刊2022年的影響因子為3.211。

本期目錄

1 誰會變的更智能?精密炸彈是如何擴散的

Who Gets Smart? Explaining How Precision Bombs Proliferate

2 國內監視對政治監禁的影響:來自德意志民主共和國的證據

The Impact of Domestic Surveillance on Political Imprisonment: Evidence from the German Democratic Republic

3 國家崩潰和軍隊分裂叛亂

State breakdown and Army-Splinter Rebellions

4 宵禁之於政治偏好的影響

The Effect of Curfews on Political Preferences

5 揮舞木槌還是穩住天平?國內法律體系和衝突後司法

Wielding the Gavel or Balancing the Scales? Domestic Legal Systems and Post-Conflict Justice

6 國內衝突中的和平談判:一份新數據集

Peace Negotiations in Civil Conflicts: A New Dataset

內容摘要

誰會變的更智能?精密炸彈是如何擴散的

題目:Who Gets Smart? Explaining How Precision Bombs Proliferate

作者:Lauren Kahn,賓夕法尼亞大學佩里世界之家研究員;Michael C. Horowitz,賓夕法尼亞大學佩里世界之家教授。

摘要:智能武器象徵著世界各國軍事力量的核心因素,並且沒有什麼比智能炸彈更能代表智能武器,如美國在越南戰爭中首次亮相的制導航空炸彈。然而,國際關係學者對這些武器及其擴散的成因知之甚少。本文對智能炸彈擴散的核心驅動因素進行理論分析以幫助擁有它們的國家遵守戰爭法,這些因素包括安全環境、政權類型以及各國針對(炸彈)精密性的興趣之間的相互作用。本文接著介紹1960年至2017年有關智能炸彈的新數據集。得到的結果表明內部和外部安全威脅使這些國家更可能獲得智能炸彈。上述結論和政權類型以及這些國家是否更有可能批准與戰爭法有關的條約相互作用。人均GDP和經濟能力似乎也扮演著這些國家使用智能炸彈的基礎因素。

Smart weapons represent a key element of military power for countries around the world, and nothing symbolizes them more than smart bombs—the guided aerial bombs that the United States debuted in the Vietnam War. Yet, international relations scholars know little about these weapons and what explains their proliferation. In this paper, we theorize about the key drivers of smart bomb proliferation, including an interaction between the security environment, regime type, and the interest of states in precision to help them follow the law of war. We then introduce a new dataset on smart bombs from 1960-2017. The results show that internal and external security threats make countries more likely to acquire smart bombs. These effects interact with regime type and whether countries are more likely to ratify treaties related to the law of war. GDP per capita and economic capacity also appears fundamental to explaining smart bomb adoption.

國內監視對政治監禁的影響:來自德意志民主共和國的證據

題目:The Impact of Domestic Surveillance on Political Imprisonment: Evidence from the German Democratic Republic

作者:Christoph Valentin Steinert,德國曼海姆大學政治科學學院研究員。

摘要:國內監視是如何影響專制國家政治監禁發生率的?有別於傳統認知,本文認為監視會減少在權力最大化的專制國家中的政治監禁發生率。監視減少有關正確鎮壓目標的不確定性,允許更有選擇性的拘留並轉向使用無聲的鎮壓工具。為探究上述論點,本文收集1984年至1988年間德意志民主共和國中一個特定的縣級政治監禁數據集,用新收集的縣級監視行動數據來作為被監視人數的指標,並使用普通最小二乘回歸(OLS)、隨機效應和工具變量模型來探究監視對政治監禁的影響。本文發現政治監禁伴隨著被監視個體監視比例的提高而減少。此外,監視滲透水平的提升與系統地轉向無聲的鎮壓工具有關。

How does domestic surveillance affect the frequency of political imprisonments in autocratic states? In contrast to conventional wisdom, I argue that surveillance reduces the frequency of political imprisonments in power-maximizing autocracies. Surveillance decreases uncertainty about the correct targets of repression, allowing for more selective detentions and shifts to silent instruments of repression. To investigate these claims, I draw on a unique county-level dataset of political imprisonment in the German Democratic Republic between 1984 and 1988. I proxy the number of monitored individuals with newly collected county-level data on surveillance operations. I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, random effects, and instrumental variable models to investigate the impact of surveillance on political imprisonment. I find that higher shares of spies per monitored individual were associated with a reduction of political imprisonment. Further, increasing levels of spy infiltration were linked to a systematic shift to silent instruments of repression.

國家崩潰和軍隊分裂叛亂

題目:State breakdown and Army-Splinter Rebellions

作者:Theodore McLauchlin,加拿大蒙特婁大學政治科學學院副教授。

摘要:在阿富汗、利比亞、賴比瑞亞以及其他地區,軍隊叛亂往往在它們分崩離析時就已經開始。那麼叛亂究竟會在何時發生?本文使用新數據來對這些軍隊分裂叛亂進行大樣本分析,這些叛亂不同於自下而上或來自政變的非軍事叛亂。本文發現,這些叛亂遵循國家崩潰的邏輯,該邏輯側重機制特徵(個人主義機制和冷戰結束時失去超級大國的支持)而不是由自下而上的大規模動員驅動。相比之下,這些政權層面的因素對於在關於內戰起源的理論中占主導地位的非軍事叛亂而言,其重要性要小得多。本文還表明軍隊叛亂者的一個選項是不試圖發動政變而直接叛亂。因此,本文區分出截然不同的武裝衝突路徑,且驗證軍隊分崩離析時國家為何崩潰,並涉及政變和內戰二者間廣為人知的權衡。

In Afghanistan, Libya, Liberia and beyond, armed rebellions have begun when armies fell apart. When does this occur? This paper conducts a large-N analysis of these army-splinter rebellions, distinct from both non-military rebellions from below and from coups, using new data. It finds that they follow a logic of state breakdown focusing on regime characteristics (personalist regimes and the loss of superpower support at the end of the Cold War) rather than drivers of mass mobilization from below. In contrast, these regime-level factors matter much less for the non-military rebellions from below that dominate theorizing about civil war origins. This paper also shows that one option for military rebels lies in not attempting a coup but instead heading straight into a rebellion. This paper thus distinguishes highly different paths to armed conflict, validates the state breakdown approach to why armies fall apart, and extends the well-known tradeoff between coups and civil wars.

宵禁之於政治偏好的影響

題目:The Effect of Curfews on Political Preferences

作者Deniz Aksoy,聖路易斯華盛頓大學政治科學學院研究員;Andrew Menger,范德堡大學政治科學學院副教授;Margit Tavits,聖路易斯華盛頓大學政治科學學院教授。

摘要:政府常常會使用宵禁作為反叛亂的措施。這種國家行為會影響公民的政治偏好嗎?本文認為,公民的回應取決於他們的群體一致性。站在政府一邊的公民更傾向於將國家的行為解讀為服務於他們的利益的行動,並因而支持政府。然而,站在叛亂運動一邊的公民傾向於將同樣的行為理解成針對自己的行動並脫離政治,他們沒有理由支持執政黨,同時可能也害怕表達出對與叛亂運動有關聯的政黨的支持。本文從土耳其在宵禁之前和過程中的調查數據中找到對上述論點的支持。當宵禁開始時,土耳其人通常會增加對執政黨的支持。然而,庫德人並沒有增加對執政黨或反對黨的支持。相反,本文提供有關他們撤回對庫爾德反對派支持並且在表達任何政治偏好時更加猶豫的強力證據。

Governments often use curfews as counterinsurgency measures. Do such state actions affect citizens』 political preferences? We argue that citizens』 responses depend on their group alignment. Citizens who are aligned with the government are more likely to interpret state actions as serving their interests and reward the governing parties as a result. Citizens who are aligned with the insurgent movement, however, are likely to interpret these same actions as targeted and disengage from politics: they have no reason to reward the governing parties and may also be fearful of expressing support for the parties affiliated with the insurgent movement. We find support for this argument with survey data from Turkey, fielded before and during curfews. When exposed to curfews, Turks generally increase their support for the governing party. However, Kurds do not increase their support for the governing party or the opposition; instead, we present strong evidence that they withdraw their support from the Kurdish opposition and become more hesitant to express any political preferences.

揮舞木槌還是穩住天平?國內法律體系和衝突後司法

題目:Wielding the Gavel or Balancing the Scales? Domestic Legal Systems and Post-Conflict Justice

作者:Joseph M. Cox,美國亞利桑那大學政府與公共政策學院博士生;Rachel D. Van Nostrand,美國亞利桑那大學政府與公共政策學院博士生。

摘要:本研究分析國內法律體系的機制性差異,關注普通法系對於先例的遵循、司法服從的依賴減少,以及法院的獨立程度。司法機構的這些機制性特徵給法院在執行衝突後司法方面發揮更積極的作用提供了機會,使其他決策者對衝突後司法程序的最終輪廓更加難以把握。為減少此種不確定性,處於這類機制環境中的決策者將不太可能執行衝突後司法。本文分析衝突後司法數據集中的數據,發現與推行大陸法系或伊斯蘭法系的國家相比,推行普通法系的國家不太可能會去執行和貫徹衝突後司法。此外,獨立法院不太可能採用混合式或恢復式的衝突後司法,儘管總體上而言司法獨立只有微弱影響。

This study analyzes the institutional variation across domestic legal systems, with a focus on common law system’s adherence to precedent and reduced recourse to judicial deference, as well as on the degree of independence afforded to courts. These institutional qualities of judiciaries provide the opportunity for courts to play a more active role in the implementation of post-conflict justice, increasing uncertainty for other policymakers concerning the ultimate contours of post-conflict justice processes. To reduce such uncertainty, policymakers ensconced in these types of institutional contexts will be less likely to implement post-conflict justice. Using data from the Post-Conflict Justice dataset, we find that states with common law systems are less likely to pursue and implement post-conflict justice compared to states with civil or Islamic law systems. Moreover, independent courts will be less likely to pursue mixed or restorative forms post-conflict justice, though the impact of judicial independence is weak overall.

國內衝突中的和平談判:一份新數據集

題目:Peace Negotiations in Civil Conflicts: A New Dataset

作者:Barış Arı,英國東安格利亞大學政治、哲學和語言傳播學院研究員。

摘要:本文介紹國內衝突中的和平談判(PNCC)數據集,該數據集確定締約國和敵對非國家武裝團體是否處於和平進程的正式談判階段。PNCC數據集超越記錄和平談判的實例,通過提供一個概念框架來確定政府-反叛組織二元體何時面臨正式談判的風險。該概念框架明確考慮事件-歷史系統模型的核心問題,包括審查和觀察期。PNCC數據集還提供有關談判的詳細信息,包括和平談判的日期和地點,以及談判是雙邊形式還是調解形式。PNCC數據集是在單一框架內區分調解式和非調解式國內衝突談判的一手資料。PNCC數據集以覆蓋1975年至2013年的全球範圍的UCDP/PRIO武裝衝突數據集為基礎,並可集成到常用的內戰數據集中。

This article introduces the Peace Negotiations in Civil Conflicts (PNCC) dataset, which identifies whether a state-party and rival non-state armed group is in the formal negotiation phase of a peace process. The PNCC goes beyond recording instances of peace talks by offering a conceptual framework to identify when a government-rebel group dyad is at risk of formal negotiations. It explicitly considers issues central in event-history modelling, including censoring and the observation period. The PNCC also provides detailed information on negotiations, including the date and location of peace talks, and whether negotiations were bilateral or through mediation. The PNCC is the first source to distinguish mediated and non-mediated civil conflict negotiations under a single framework. Structured over the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset with global coverage for 1975-2013, the PNCC is integrable to commonly used civil war datasets.

編譯 | 崔育淶

審校 | 周杼樾

排版 | 肖瑞

本文來源於《衝突解決雜誌》。文章評譯內容為公益分享,服務於科研教學,不代表本平台觀點。

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